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ABSTRACT 
There are an increasing number of older installations in 
use on the Norwegian Continental shelf. Inspections are a key 
issue in ensuring the safety of an older installation, and the 
inspection intervals, inspection methods and its reliability are 
clearly influencing the safety of the installations. Different 
approaches for updating inspection plans for older 
installations are considered in order to achieve decreased 
inspection intervals as the structure are ageing. The most 
promising method consists in increasing the rate of defects / 
crack initiation at the end of the expected lifetime.  
Different system aspects are considered incl. assessment 
of the acceptable annual probability of failure for one 
component dependent on the number of critical components. 
Information obtained from inspection of one component can 
be used not only to update the inspection plan for that 
component, but also for other nearby components. An 
example indicates that a high degree of correlation between 
the uncertain parameters in different components is needed in 
order to obtain substantial information which can be used in 
inspection planning. 
Fatigue failure of one (or more) components does not 
necessary imply total collapse of the structure. The importance 
of each component can be measured by the RIF (Residual 
Influence Factor) for each component and is illustrated by 
examples. When an installation becomes older then the 
number of fatigue critical components can be expected to 
increase. If the maximum acceptable annual system 
probability of failure is the same as for a new installation, this 
implies that the acceptable annual fatigue probability of 
failure decrease, which again implies more inspections. 
INTRODUCTION 
The number of older installations is increasing in the 
Norwegian Continental shelf. The regulation of these older 
installations is a part of the Petroleum Safety Authority’s 
responsibility, with the intention of ensuring that also older 
installations can be regarded as safe. Inspections, maintenance 
and repair of the installations are a key issue in ensuring the 
safety of older installation, and the inspection intervals, 
inspection methods and its reliability are clearly influencing 
the knowledge of the safety of the installations. Development 
of a risk based inspection approach for aging platforms taking 
into account that for aging platforms several small cracks can 
be expected – implying an increased risk.  
Reliability and Risk Based Inspection (RBI) planning for 
offshore structures have been an area of high practical interest 
over the last decades, especially within inspection planning 
for welded connections subject to fatigue crack growth in 
fixed steel offshore platforms. The basic assumption made in 
RBI planning is that a Bayesian approach can be used. This 
implies that probabilities of failure can be updated in a 
consistent way when new information (from inspections) 
becomes available. Further, the RBI approach for inspection 
planning is often based on the assumption that at all future 
inspections no cracks are detected. If a crack is detected then a 
new inspection plan should be developed. The Bayesian 
approach and the no-crack detection assumption imply that the 
inspection time intervals usually become longer and longer 
with time. It is noted that RBI planning for future inspections 
are based on predefined ‘decision rules’ on repair / 
maintenance when inspection results become available. 
Further, inspection planning based on the RBI approach 
implies that single fatigue critical components are considered, 
one at the time, but with the acceptable reliability level 
assessed based on the consequence for the whole structure in 
case of fatigue failure of single components. 
Examples and information on reliability-based inspection 
and maintenance planning can be found in a number of 
papers, e.g. Madsen, Sørensen & Olesen [1], Skjong [2], 
Sørensen, Faber, Rackwitz & Thoft-Christensen [3], Ersdal 
[4], Sørensen, Straub & Faber [5], Moan [6], Straub & Faber 
[7], Faber, Sørensen Tychsen & Straub [8] and PIA [9].  
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For aging installations an increasing amount of small 
defects / cracks are expected to be observed when the 
installation approaches the design lifetime implying an 
increased risk for defect / crack initiation (and coalescence of 
small defects / cracks) and increased crack growth. An 
increased crack initiation rate should imply shorter inspection 
time intervals for ageing installations. 
In this paper it is assumed that installations in life 
extension should have the same reliability level as 
installations in the design life, thus giving the same safety for 
people and environment. A sufficient safety level in life 
extension can be obtained by reduced uncertainty about the 
installation due to knowledge from operation, dedicated 
maintenance with respect to ageing, modifications of 
structure, change from ‘safe life thinking’ to ‘damage tolerant 
thinking’ and/or by an appropriate risk-based maintenance 
approach. This paper considers different ways of formulating 
a risk-based maintenance approach for inspection planning of 
ageing installations. 
For many installations there will be a (large) number of 
critical details (components), implying the following 
important aspects to be considered in this paper: 
a. Due to common loading, common model uncertainties 
and correlation between inspection qualities it can be 
expected that information obtained from inspection of one 
component can be used not only to update the inspection 
plan for that component, but also for other nearby 
components. Further, the common history and loading 
also implies an increased risk of several correlated 
components fail at almost the same time.  
b. Assessment of the acceptable annual fatigue probability 
of failure for a particular component can be dependent on 
the number of critical components. The acceptable annual 
probability of failure of a component is obtained 
considering the importance of the component through the 
conditional probability of failure given failure of the 
component.  
c. Fatigue failure of one (or more) components does not 
necessary imply total collapse of the structure. The 
importance of each component can be measured by the 
RIF (Residual Influence Factor) for each component. 
How many components fail by fatigue before total 
collapse of structure?  
d. When an installation becomes older then the number of 
fatigue critical components can be expected to increase. If 
the maximum acceptable annual system probability of 
failure is the same as for a new installation, this implies 
that the acceptable annual fatigue probability of 
component/fatigue failure decrease.  
INSPECTION PLANNING FOR OLDER 
INSTALLATIONS  
Various investigations in reliability-based inspection 
planning for aging installations have been considered and 
analyzed in Sørensen & Ersdal [10] especially with the aim to 
discuss and investigate how decreased inspection time 
intervals could be obtained when time approaches and goes 
beyond the design lifetime. 
The following models are considered for modifying 
inspection intervals for older installations:  
a. Increase of expected value of initial crack size with time – 
due to coalescence of smaller cracks. 
b. Non-perfect repairs - by detection of cracks the repair is 
not perfect, and a new crack is initiated.  
c. Human errors in inspections (beyond uncertainty included 
in POD-curves). 
d. Increased rate of crack initiation - adjustment of the crack 
initiation time such that initiation of cracks increase with 
time (bath-tub effect). The increase of crack initiation can 
be in excess of the crack initiation expected at the design 
state (and obtained by reliability-based calibration to SN-
curves) due to the aging effects (e.g. by coalescence of 
small defects / cracks). 
 
Table 1. Stochastic model for SN-approach in examples. D: 
Deterministic, N: Normal, LN: LogNormal. 
Variable Distribution Exp. value Standard deviation 
Δ  LN 1 0.2 
SCFZ  LN 1 COV =0.10 
waveZ  LN 1 COV =0.30 
LT  D 25 years  
FT  D 75 years  
1m  D 3  
1log K  N 12.048  0.218 
2m  D 4  
2log K  N 13.980  0.291 
1log K  and 2log K  are assumed fully correlated 
 
Table 2. Uncertainty modeling used in the fracture mechanical 
reliability analysis. W: Weibull. 
Variable Dist. Expected value Standard dev. 
IN  W 0Iμ  (fitted) COV =0.35 
0a  D 0.4 mm  
Cln  N Clnμ  (fitted) 0.77 
m  D 3  
SCFZ  LN 1 0.10 
waveZ  LN 1 0.30 
ca  D T (thickness)  
Y  LN 1 0.1 
T  D 50 mm  
Cln  and IN  are correlated with correlation coefficient 
INC ,ln
ρ = -0.5 
Representative examples are used to evaluate the different 
models, see [10]. The results indicate that model d) is the most 
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promising. In the following example the extra cracks in the 
fatigue critical area are assumed to initiate following a linear 
model in the time interval [ ]ETT ,0  and that the expected 
number of extra cracks is δδ−1  ( 10 ≤< δ ) implying a 
crack initiation rate ( ) ( )012 TTEI −−= δα  at ET .   
Monte Carlo simulations are used to estimate the 
reliability as function of time by the SN-approach / Miners 
rule and by the fracture mechanics approach (FM) calibrated 
to the SN-approach. For illustration a 1-dimensional fracture 
mechanics model is used. The stochastic models used are 
shown in tables 1 and 2, see details in [10]. Δ  models the 
uncertainty related to Miners rule; SCFZ  and waveZ  model 
uncertainty related to the stress analysis and to the wave load; 
LT  and FT  are the design life and the fatigue life; 1m and 2m  
are the upper and lower slopes of a bilinear SN-curve; 1log K  
and 2log K  are the corresponding intersection with the Slog  
axis where S  is the stress range. In the FM approach IN  is 
the number of cycles to crack initiation; 0a  is the initial crack 
length; m  and Cln  ate the parameters in Paris equation; ca  
is the critical crack length and Y  is a geometry function. The 
parameters in the fracture mechanical model are calibrated to 
0Iμ  = 5 years and ln CCμ = -25.5. 
The reliability index (based on accumulated probability of 
failure) is shown in figure 1. It is seen that a satisfactory 
agreement between the SN and the FM approach is obtained. 
0
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0 5 10 15 20 25
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Figure 1. Reliability index (accumulated) as function of time 
for SN approach and calibrated FM-approach. 
 
RBI planning with no modifications results in the 
inspection times shown in table 3 for maxFPΔ  = 
410− . It is seen 
that inspection time intervals increase with time – most of the 
fastest growing cracks are detected and repaired in the first 
inspections, and thus only few critical cracks are left when 
time approaches the design lifetime. 
 
 
Table 3. Inspection times and inspection time intervals in 
years. ‘No modification’. maxFPΔ  = 
410− . 
Inspection 
time 
6 7 9 11 14 18 22 29 39 53 
Inspection 
interval 
6 1 2 2 3 4 4 7 10 14 
 
Table 4. Inspection times and inspection time intervals in 
years.  
Inspection time 6 8 9 11 13 17 22 
Inspection interval 6 2 1 2 2 4 5 
 30 38 43 48 53 58  
 8 8 5 5 5 5  
 
As an example for application of model d) extra cracks 
are assumed to initiate with δ  = 0.25 and [ ]ETT ,0  = [25-60], 
From the results in table 4 it is seen the inspection time 
intervals decrease. Similar results are obtained for  maxFPΔ  = 
310− . 
SYSTEMS EFFECTS – INSPECTION PLANNING WITH 
CORRELATION BETWEEN COMPONENTS 
This section describes the effect of correlation between 
fatigue failure in different components due to common 
loading, common model uncertainties and correlation between 
inspection qualities. The information obtained from inspection 
of one component can be used not only to update the 
inspection plan for that component, but also for other nearby 
components. Further, the common history and loading also 
implies an increased risk of several correlated components fail 
at almost the same time. 
As an example two fatigue critical components with limit 
state equations 0)(1 =tg  and 0)(2 =tg  are considered. The 
events corresponding to detection of a crack at inspection time 
T can similarly be modeled by 0)(1 ≤Th  and 0)(2 ≤Th . 
Updated probabilities of failure of component 1 and 2 
given no detection of cracks in detail 1 and 2 are  
( ) ( )( )00 1111, >≤= ThtgPPF  (1) 
( ) ( )( )00 2222, >≤= ThtgPPF  (2) 
( ) ( )( )00 1212, >≤= ThtgPPF   (3) 
( ) ( )( )00 2121, >≤= ThtgPPF  (4) 
(1) and (2) represent situations where a component is updated 
with inspection of the same component. (3) and (4) represent 
situations where a component is updated with inspection of 
another component. The above formulas can easily be 
extended to cases where more components are inspected.  
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Figure 2. Reliability index as function of time for component 
no. 1 and updated reliability if inspection of component no. 1 
at time 0T , or of component no. 2 at time 0T  with large and 
small positive correlation with component no. 1. 
 
In figure 2 is illustrated the effect on inspection planning 
for a component if this component is inspected or if another 
nearby component is inspected. The largest effect on 
reliability updating and thus inspection planning is obtained 
inspecting the same component or inspection of another 
component with a large correlation with the considered 
component. 
As an example two components are considered with same 
stochastic model as in the previous section. It is assumed that 
component 1 is inspected, and if a crack is detected, then both 
component 1 and 2 are repaired. Further it is assumed that 
each of the stochastic variables SCFZ , waveZ  and Y  are fully 
correlated in the two elements. IN  and Cln  are assumed 
independent in the two components. No extra cracks are 
initiated and maxFPΔ  = 
310− . Inspections should be performed 
at year 14, 23 and 35. In figure 3 is shown the accumulated 
probability of failure for the two components. It is seen that 
the probability of failure for component 2 decrease compared 
with no inspection, but is much higher than for the inspected 
component 1. 
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Figure 3. Accumulated probability of failure as function of 
time. 
 
Next it is assumed that the stochastic variable Cln  is 
fully correlated in component 1 and 2. In figure 4 is shown the 
accumulated probability of failure for the two components. It 
is seen that now the probability of failure for component 2 is 
almost the same as for component 1. 
These results indicate that a relatively high degree of 
correlation between the uncertain parameters in different 
components is needed in order to obtain substantial 
information which can be used in inspection planning. 
Next, the effect is considered of requiring that the 
calculated fatigue of a non-inspected detail should be at least 3 
times longer than the hot spot that is inspected. Provided that 
fatigue cracks are not detected at the region with a short 
calculated life, it is also likely that the considered hot spot has 
sufficient fatigue capacity (due to correlation in load action).  
Component 1 and 2 are calibrated such that component 1 has 
FDF = 3 ( LT =25 years; FT =75 years) and component 2 has 
FDF = 9 ( LT =25 years; FT =225 years). Three examples are 
considered with max annual probability of failure maxFPΔ  = 
41010 −⋅ , 4105 −⋅  and 4105.2 −⋅ . 
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Figure 4. Accumulated probability of failure as function of 
time.  
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Figure 5. Accumulated probability of failure as function of 
time. Without extra crack initiation and maxFPΔ  = 
41010 −⋅ . 
Case 1) maxFPΔ  =
41010 −⋅ : Inspections of component 1 are 
necessary at years 14, 21, 34. Annual probabilities of failure 
as function of time are shown in figure 5. For component 2: 
FPΔ (25) = 0.9 
410−⋅ ; FPΔ (60) =3.3
410−⋅ , i.e. the reliability 
level of component 2 is satisfactory. 
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Figure 6. Accumulated probability of failure as function of 
time. Without extra crack initiation and maxFPΔ  = 
4105 −⋅ . 
Case 2) maxFPΔ  = 
4105 −⋅ : Inspections of component 1 are 
necessary at years 10, 14, 19, 28, 42. Annual probabilities of 
failure as function of time are shown in figure 6. For 
component 2: FPΔ (25) = 1.0 
410−⋅ ; FPΔ (60) = 3.1
410−⋅ , i.e. 
the reliability level of component 2 is satisfactory. 
Case 3) maxFPΔ  = 
4105.2 −⋅ : Inspections of component 1 
are necessary at years 8, 10, 13, 17, 23, 32, 44. Annual 
probabilities of failure as function of time are shown in figure 
7. For component 2: FPΔ (25) = 0.6 
410−⋅ ; FPΔ (60) = 
3.0 410−⋅ , i.e. the reliability level of component 2 is 
satisfactory at time LT = 25 years, but not at the extended 
lifetime LT = 60 years. 
 
0,0000
0,0002
0,0004
0,0006
0,0008
0,0010
0,0012
0,0014
0,0016
0,0018
0,0020
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
time (years)
an
nu
al
 P
_f
comp 1 - no inspection
comp 2 - no inspection
comp 1 - with inspection
comp 2 - inspection comp 1
 
Figure 7. Accumulated probability of failure as function of 
time. Without extra crack initiation and maxFPΔ  = 
4105.2 −⋅ . 
SYSTEM EFFECTS – ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 
DEPENDING ON NUMBER OF COMPONENTS 
In regard to fatigue failures the requirements to safety are 
typically given in terms of a required Fatigue Design Factor 
(FDF). As an example NORSOK [11] specifies the FDF’s in 
Table 3. 
From the FDF’s specified in Table 5 it is possible to 
establish the corresponding annual probabilities of failure for 
a specific year. For the joints to be considered in an inspection 
plan, the acceptance criteria for the annual probability of 
fatigue failure may be assessed through the RSR (Reserve 
Strength Ratio) given failure of each of the individual joints to 
be considered together with the annual probability of joint 
fatigue failure. If the RSR given joint fatigue failure is known, 
it is possible to establish the corresponding annual collapse 
failure probability given fatigue failure, FATCOLP  . 
 
Table 5. Fatigue Design Factors. Factors relate to ‘mean ÷ 2 
standard deviation’ SN-curves. 
Access for inspection and repair 
Accessible 
Classification of 
structural components 
based on damage 
consequence 
No access 
or in the 
splash 
zone 
Below 
splash 
zone 
Above 
splash 
zone 
Substantial 
consequences 
10 3 2 
Without substantial 
consequences 
3 2 1 
 
In order to assess the acceptable annual probability of 
fatigue failure for a particular joint in a platform the reliability 
of the considered platform must be calculated conditional on 
fatigue failure of the considered joint. The importance of a 
fatigue failure is measured by the Residual Influence Factor 
defined as 
intact
damaged
RSR
RSRRIF =  (5) 
where intactRSR  is the RSR  value for the intact structure and 
damagedRSR is the RSR  value for the structure damaged by 
fatigue failure of a joint. The principal relation between RIF 
and annual collapse probability is illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Example relationship between Residual Influence 
Factors (RIF) and annual collapse probability of failure - 
( )FATCOLP . 
 
The implicit code requirement to the safety of the 
structure in regard to total collapse may be assessed through 
the annual probability of joint fatigue failure (in the last year 
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
RIF
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1E-1
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Pf
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in service) 
jFAT
P  for a joint for which the consequences of 
failure are “substantial” (i.e. FDF = 10). This probability can 
be regarded an acceptance criteria i.e. ACP . A typical maximal 
allowed annual probability of collapse failure is in the order of 
ACP =10
-5. 
A general relation between RSR  and the probability of 
failure can be obtained considering e.g. the following limit 
state function: 
abHRxg −=)(  (6) 
where R is the effective capacity of the platform, a is a shape 
factor typically equal to 2, b is an influence coefficient taking 
into account model uncertainty parameter and aH  is a 
stochastic variable modeling the maximum annual value of the 
environmental load parameter. The RSR value as evaluated by 
a push-over analysis can be related to characteristic values of 
R, a, b and H i.e. RC, bC and HC. The characteristic value for 
R, b and aH  could be defined as 5%, 50% and 99% quantile 
values of their probability distributions.  
It is assumed that R and b can be modeled 
probabilistically as LogNormal distributed random variables 
and 2H  as a Gumbel distributed random variable. The 
coefficients of variation are chosen to RCOV =0.10, 
bCOV =0.10 and 2HCOV =0.214. Using these values 
RSR =1.79 and the annual probability of failure (collapse) 
COLP =
510−  are obtained.  
In the following three approximations are considered to 
assess the maximum annual probability of fatigue failure, 
max
, jFATPΔ . It is assumed that N  components/members are 
critical, the members contribute equally to the probability of 
failure and only one fatigue critical component fails before 
total collapse: 
• Simple upper bound on the system probability of failure 
• An approximate estimate of the system probability of 
failure assuming that fatigue failure implies load bearing 
capacities correlated due to common loading 
• An approximate estimate of the system probability of 
failure assuming that fatigue failure in different 
components is correlated due to common model 
uncertainties. 
 
Model 1) simple upper bound on the system probability 
of failure: 
( ) ( ) ( )jjjsysF FATPFATCOLPNFATCOLPNP ⋅⋅=∩⋅≅  (7) 
implying: 
FATCOL
AC
FAT P
P
N
P 1max =Δ  (8) 
max
FATPΔ  is shown in figure 9 and 10 for 
510−=ACP  and 
410−=ACP , and for N =1, 2, 5 and 10 critical components. 
Model 2) approximate estimate of the system probability 
of failure assuming that fatigue failure implies load bearing 
capacities correlated due to common loading:  
{ } { } { }( )NsysF FATCOLFATCOLFATCOLPP ∪∪∪= ...21
( )jFATP⋅  (9)
implying  
SYS
AC
FAT P
PP =Δ max  (10) 
where ( )ρ;,...,,1 21 NNSYSP βββΦ−=  with the reliability index 
for each member given fatigue failure is ( )
iFATCOLi
P1−Φ−=β  
and the correlation coefficients in the correlation coefficient 
matrix, ρ  are obtained assuming that only the wave loading is 
common in different components, i.e. the load bearing 
capacities are independent in case of fatigue failure of 
different members . max, jFATPΔ  estimated by (10) is shown in 
figure 11 and 12 for 510−=ACP  and 
410−=ACP , and for 
N =1, 2, 5 and 10 critical components. 
Model 3) approximate estimate of the system probability 
of failure assuming that fatigue failure in different 
components are correlated due to common model 
uncertainties:  
( ) ( )NsysF FATFATFATPFATCOLPP ∪∪∪⋅= ...21  (11)
implying that the maximum acceptable probability of member 
fatigue failure is obtained form the requirement: 
( ) ACFAT PPFATCOLP ≤Δ⋅  (12) 
where  ( )ρ;,...,,1 21 NNFATP βββΦ−=Δ  with the reliability 
index for each member given fatigue failure is 
( )max,1 jFATj PΔΦ−= −β  and the correlation coefficients in the 
correlation coefficient matrix, ρ  are obtained assuming that 
only the fatigue model uncertainties are common in different 
fatigue critical components, i.e. the fatigue strength modeled 
are independent in case of fatigue failure of different 
members. The simple relationship between ( )FATCOLP  and 
RIF  in figure 13 is used. max, jFATPΔ  estimated by (13) is shown 
in figure 14 and 15 for the common correlation coefficients 
ρ =0.5 and for  510−=ACP  and 410−=ACP . 
Model 3 is considered the most reasonable, but from the 
results it is seen that the simple upper bounds in figure 3 for 
N =1, 2, 5 and 10 critical components give conservative 
 7 Copyright © 2008 by ASME 
estimates of the acceptable annual probability of fatigue 
failure. 
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Figure 9. Model 1 - maximum acceptable annual probability 
of fatigue failure, maxFATPΔ  for each fatigue critical detail as 
function of RIF (Residual Influence Factor). 510−=ACP . 
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Figure 10. Model 1 - Maximum acceptable annual probability 
of fatigue failure, maxFATPΔ  for each fatigue critical detail as 
function of RIF (Residual Influence Factor). 410−=ACP . 
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Figure 11. Model 2 - Maximum acceptable annual probability 
of fatigue failure, maxFATPΔ  for each fatigue critical detail as 
function of RIF (Residual Influence Factor). 510−=ACP . 
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Figure 12. Model 2 - Maximum acceptable annual probability 
of fatigue failure, maxFATPΔ  for each fatigue critical detail as 
function of RIF (Residual Influence Factor). 410−=ACP . 
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Figure 13. Model 2 - Relationship between ( )FATCOLP  and 
RIF . 
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Figure 14. Model 3 - Maximum acceptable annual probability 
of fatigue failure, maxFATPΔ  for each fatigue critical detail as 
function of RIF (Residual Influence Factor). 510−=ACP  and 
ρ =0.5. 
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Figure 15. Model 3 - Maximum acceptable annual probability 
of fatigue failure, maxFATPΔ  for each fatigue critical detail as 
function of RIF (Residual Influence Factor). 410−=ACP  and 
ρ =0.5. 
SYSTEM EFFECTS – NUMBER OF COMPONENTS 
TO FAIL BY FATIGUE BEFORE TOTAL COLLAPSE 
In this section it is investigated how many fatigue critical 
components fail before collapse of the installation. The model 
for the ultimate load bearing capacity (collapse) described in 
the above section is used. 
N =5 fatigue critical components are assumed. Life time 
realizations of the crack size are generated using the stochastic 
model described in previous sections. In case of failure of one 
of the fatigue critical components the load bearing capacity R 
is reduced by a factor equal to RIF . If m  components are 
failed by fatigue at time t , then the load bearing capacity R is 
reduced by a factor mRIF . If a component is inspected and a 
crack is detected then it is assumed that all N  components are 
repaired.  
Figures 16 and 17 show the expected number of fatigue 
critical components failed in case of total collapse with RIF  
= 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9. It is seen that for RIF  less than 
approximately 0.4 only one fatigue critical component fail 
before collapse. 
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Figure 16. Expected number of components failed by fatigue 
in case of total collapse failure of structure for RIF  = 0.3, 
0.5, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9 without inspections. 
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Figure 17. Expected number of components failed by fatigue 
in case of total collapse failure of structure for RIF  = 0.3, 
0.5, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9 with inspections. 
 
The above results indicate that for structures with 5 
fatigue critical components up to 4 fatigue critical components 
have to fail before collapse when RIF is large (larger than 
0.8). Only one fatigue critical component has to fail before 
collapse when RIF is small (smaller than 0.4). This implies 
that assessment of the maximum acceptable annual probability 
of fatigue failure is more complicated than described in the 
previous section when RIF is large. 
SYSTEM EFFECTS – INCREASED NUMBER OF 
FATIGUE CRITICAL COMPONENTS 
Table 5. Number of fatigue critical elements: 
Year  0-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 
Number of elements 10 15 20 25 
 
Table 6.  maxFATPΔ  as function of RIF. 
RI
F 
( )FCP
 
 maxFATPΔ  
[0;30] 
 maxFATPΔ  
[30,40] 
 maxFATPΔ  
[40,50] 
 maxFATPΔ  
[50,60] 
0.2 1 1·10-4 0.67·10-4 0.50·10-4 0.40·10-4 
0.4 0.18 5.6·10-4 3.7·10-4 2.8·10-4 2.2·10-4 
0.5 0.075 13·10-4 8.9·10-4 6.7·10-4 5.3·10-4 
0.6 0.032 32·10-4 21·10-4 15·10-4 13·10-4 
0.7 0.013 75·10-4 50·10-4 37·10-4 30·10-4 
0.8 0.056 178·10-4 119·10-4 89·10-4 71·10-4 
 
Table 7. Inspection time intervals in years. 
RIF  
0.2 6 2 2 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 
0.4 10 4 6 9 11 12      
0.5 17 12 12         
0.6 30 20          
0.7 53           
0.8            
 
When an installation becomes older the number of fatigue 
critical components can be expected to increase. If the 
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maximum acceptable annual system probability of failure is 
required to be the same as for a new installation, this implies 
that the component acceptable annual fatigue probability of 
failure decreases. The number of fatigue critical components 
is expected to develop as shown in table 5 and ACP  is chosen 
to 310− .  maxFATPΔ  determined using the simple upper bound 
approach is shown in table 6, and the corresponding 
inspection time intervals are shown in table 7. 
 
Table 8. Number of fatigue critical elements. 
Year  0-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 
Number of elements 10 20 30 40 
 
Table 9.  maxFATPΔ  as function of RIF. 
RI
F 
( )FCP
 
 maxFATPΔ  
[0;30] 
 maxFATPΔ  
[30,40] 
 maxFATPΔ  
[40,50] 
 maxFATPΔ  
[50,60] 
0.2 1 1·10-4 0.50·10-4 0.33·10-4 0.25·10-4 
0.3 0.42 2.4·10-4 1.2·10-4 0.79·10-4 0.59·10-4 
0.4 0.18 5.6·10-4 2.8·10-4 1.9·10-4 1.4·10-4 
0.5 0.075 13·10-4 6.7·10-4 4.4·10-4 3.3·10-4 
0.6 0.032 32·10-4 16·10-4 11·10-4 7.9·10-4 
0.7 0.013 75·10-4 37·10-4 25·10-4 19·10-4 
0.8 0.006 178·10-4 89·10-4 59·10-4 44·10-4 
 
Next the number of fatigue critical components is 
expected to develop as shown in table 8. The results are 
shown in tables 9 and 10. The results indicate (as expected) 
that when the structure is ageing and the number fatigue 
critical elements increase, and that the inspection time 
intervals decrease.  
 
Table 10. Inspection time intervals in years. 
RIF  
0.2 6 2 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 11 
0.3 8 2 3 5 6 7 8 11    
0.4 10 4 6 9 9 11      
0.5 17 12 11 13        
0.6 30 13          
0.7 40           
0.8            
FATIGUE DESIGN FACTORS – IN CASE OF LIFETIME 
EXTENSION 
The problem considered in this section is how to check 
the design by deterministic calculations when an installation 
becomes older and lifetime extension is considered. For 
design of new installations the SN-approach and Fatigue 
Design Factors (FDF) as for example in table 1 can used. 
The following example is considered: the original design 
lifetime is 25 years, lifetime extension from 25 to 45 years and 
an inspection (MPI or EC) is performed at year 25 with the 
result ‘no-find’. 
A modified FDF45 to be used for the life extension is 
estimated as follows: 
• The reliability index as function of time is determined 
using the SN-approach and the FDF25 factor for life time = 
25 years. 
• The fracture mechanics model is calibrated to give 
approximately the same reliability as function of time. 
• The annual reliability index at year 25 is determined: 
( )125βΔ  
• The fractures mechanics model is re-calibrated to give the 
annual reliability index ( )125βΔ  at year 45 assuming that 
an inspection with no-find is performed at year 25, i.e. the 
reliability level during the life extension is at least the 
same as in the ordinary life. The annual reliability index at 
year 45, ( )245βΔ  is determined assuming no inspections 
• Using the SN-approach the FDF2 (with lifetime = 25 year) 
is determined which give the annual reliability index at 
year, ( )245βΔ  
• Using FDF2 a modified FDF factor related to the whole 
lifetime 45 is determined: FDF45 (assuming inspection 
with no-find at year 25). 
 
The result is shown in table 11. It is noted that only in the 
case of details in the splash zone with substantial 
consequences a new FDF factor related to the whole extended 
life (45 years) is needed. In the other cases the updating effect 
of the ‘no-find’ inspection is so large that the reliability in the 
life extension period is satisfactory (larger than the reliability 
level after 25 years). 
 
Table 11. Fatigue Design Factors for life extension from 25 to 
45 years and inspection (MPI or EC) with ‘no-find’ after 25 
years. The upper index indicate the reference life time for the 
FDF factor. Factors relate to ‘mean ÷ 2 standard deviation’ 
SN-curves.  
Classification of 
structural components 
based on damage 
consequence 
In splash 
zone 
Below 
splash 
zone 
Above 
splash 
zone 
Substantial 
consequences 
745 325 225 
Without substantial 
consequences 
325 225 125 
SUMMARY 
Different approaches for updating inspection plans for 
older installations are considered in order to achieve decreased 
inspection intervals as the structure are ageing. The most 
promising method consists in increasing the rate of defects / 
crack initiation at the end of the expected lifetime. The 
approach is illustrated for welded steel details in platforms, 
and implies that inspection time intervals decrease at the end 
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of the platform lifetime. It is noted that data is needed to 
verify the increased crack initiation model. The approaches 
described are especially developed for inspection planning of 
fatigue cracks, but can also be used for various other 
deterioration processes where inspection is relevant. 
Different system aspects are considered incl. assessment 
of the acceptable annual probability of failure for one 
component dependent on the number of critical components. 
Common loading, model uncertainties etc. imply that 
information obtained from inspection of one component can 
be used not only to update the inspection plan for that 
component, but also for other nearby components. Further, the 
common history and loading also implies an increased risk 
that several correlated components can fail at almost the same 
time. An example indicates that a high degree of correlation 
between the uncertain parameters in different components is 
needed in order to obtain substantial information which can be 
used in inspection planning. 
Assessment of the acceptable annual fatigue probability 
of failure for a particular component can be dependent on the 
number of critical components. Examples indicate that the 
acceptable annual probability of failure of a component can 
obtained using a simple upper bound. 
Fatigue failure of one (or more) components does not 
necessary imply total collapse of the structure. The importance 
of each component can be measured by the RIF (Residual 
Influence Factor) for each component. Results indicate that 
for structure with 5 fatigue critical components up to 4 fatigue 
critical components have to fail before collapse when RIF is 
large (larger than 0.8). Only one fatigue critical component 
has to fail before collapse when RIF is small (smaller than 
0.4). This implies that assessment of the maximum acceptable 
annual probability of fatigue failure has to be assessed taking 
more than one simultaneous component failure into account 
for RIF larger than 0.4. 
When an installation becomes older then the number of 
fatigue critical components can be expected to increase. If the 
maximum acceptable annual system probability of failure is 
the same as for a new installation, this implies that the 
acceptable annual fatigue probability of failure decrease, 
which again implies more inspections. 
Finally, an example of modifying the required Fatigue 
Design Factors (FDF) in case of life extension is shown 
indicating that only in the case of a detail in splash zone with 
substantial consequences a new FDF factor related to the 
whole extended life (45 years) is needed. In the other cases the 
updating effect of the ‘no-find’ inspection is so large that the 
reliability in the life extension period is satisfactory (larger 
than the reliability level after 25 years). 
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